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NO JUDICIAL DYSLEXIA: THE CUSTODIAL PARENT 
PRESUMPTION DISTINGUISHES THE PATERNAL FROM 
THE PARENTAL RIGHT TO NAME A CHILD 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When confronted with parents disagreeing about the name' of 
their child, modern courts may resolve the conflict by presuming 
that the custodial parent acts in the child's best interest. An 
objecting noncustodial parent must overcome this presumption by 
proving that the custodial parent's decision threatens the child's 
welfare according to the standards of the states. 2 This presumptive 
scheme, herein referred to as the ''custodial parent presumption,' ' 3 
merits consideration in a society where divorce frequently occurs, 4 
providing the ground for the name battle. When divorced parents 
remarry5 they extend the area for dispute. Traditionally, courts 
1. The word name in this Note refers to a person's surname, unless otherwise indicated. 
Parental disputes also relate to a child's given and middle name. See, e.g., Webber v. Parker, 167 So. 
2d 519 (La. Ct. App.) (mother named child Michael Quinn Webber, father's preference of Absalom 
Theodore Webber was denied), writ refused, 246 La. 883, 168 So. 2d 268 (1964); In re M.L.P., 621 
S.W.2d 430 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981) (mother named child after her father, Marcus Lee, and Pinkston 
after husband; father's preference of Shawn Christian or' 'something else'' was denied). 
2. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 610 (Smith-Hurd 1977) (court does not have jurisdiction to 
modify custody for two years unless the child may be severely endangered); UNIF. MARRIAGE & 
DIVORCE AcT§ 409(a) (1970) (two-year period). 
3. The term "custodial parent presumption," though not expressly used by any court, 
combines the denotations of the custody and parent to signify the presumptive scheme articulated by 
concurring judge Mosk in In re Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d 640, 648-51,620 P.2d 579, 584-85, 169 Cal. 
Rptr. 918, 923-25 (1980)(Mosk, J., concurring). See infra note 14. 
4. In 1980 more than nine million divorces occurred. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL 
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 37 (1981). 
5. Within the first through fifth year after divorce, without regard to age, 243 of 1,000 divorced 
men and 192 of 1,000 divorced women remarry. Uviller, Father's Rights and Feminism: The Maternal 
Presumption Revisited, 1 HARV. WoMEN's L.J.l07, 122 n.50(1978). 
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have analyzed ''paternal'' rights in naming rather than ''parental'' 
rights. 6 These courts have held that the paternal surname should 
not be changed unless the father has been given notice, 7 has 
committed a heinous act, 8 has failed to support his child, 9 has 
abandoned his child, 10 or has given the child up for adoption. 11 
Although most courts state that only the child's best interest should 
be considered, the " 'best interest of the child' test has customarily 
favored the father-child relationship." 12 
This Note will discuss whether courts should continue to 
emphasize the paternal naming right rather than recognize a 
parental naming right that arises from a court's determination of 
custody. Examination of the custodial parent presumption entails a 
three-part analysis - the definition of the custodial parent pre-
sumption, the legal significance of a name, 13 and the application 
of the custodial parent presumption to hypothetical situations to 
reveal the advantages and disadvantages of the model. With this 
6. See gen"al/y Annat., 92 A. L. R. 3o 1091 (1979). 
7. See, e.g., In reTubbs, 620 P.2d 384 (Okla. 1980) (personal notice due in post divorce ancillary 
proceeding to change a child's name). 
8. See, e.g., In re Christjohn, 286 Pa. Super. 112, 428 A.2d 598 (Super. Ct. 1981) (petition 
granted to change child's surname from father's to deceased stepfather's because father's killing of 
stepfather subjected child to severe emotional distress). 
9. See, e.g., Cohee v. Cohee, 210 Neb. 855, 317 N .W.2d 381 (1982) (granted hyphenated name, 
with father's name first, because father had not been guilty of misconduct, nor had he failed to 
support the child). 
10. In re Saxton, 309 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. 1981) (denied addition uf maternal name to paternal 
surname because father wrote letters, called, sent presents, and had custody for one month), cert. 
denied, 102 S. Ct. 1787 (1982); Robinson v. Hansel, 302 Minn. 138, 223 N.W.2d 138 (1974) (denied 
addition of stepfather's name to paternal surname because a change could sever the weak parental 
bond). 
11. In re McCoy, 31 Ohio Misc. 195, 287 N.E.2d 833 (C.P. 1972) (change of name proceeding 
considered simultaneously with adoption proceeding). 
12. Note, The Controversy ov" Children's Surnames: Family Autonomy, Equal Protection and the Child's 
&st Interest, 1979 UTAH L. REv. 303,323. In In reSchiffman]udge Mask used this passage to support 
the preference for the custodial parent presumption. In re Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d at 650, 620 P.2d at 
585, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 924 (Mask, J ., concurring). 
13. This Note describes the history of name changes arising out of litigation concerning a 
woman's right to her own name rather than the determination of custody. Dr. Ralph Slovenko, 
professor of law and psychiatry, offers the same historical perspective: "Today a recurring 
controversy over which name one may bear (or give to another) has assumed special prominence in 
legal circles largely as a result of the women!-s liberation movement but also as a result of feelings 
encouraging self-expression.'' Slovenko, On Naming, 2 AM. J. PsYCHOTHERAPY 208, 218 (1980). 
Forbush v. Wallau, decided in 1971, particularly roused women because the United States 
Supreme Court rejected the constitutional attack on an unwritten Alabama regulation requiring a 
married woman to register for a driver's license using her husband's name. Forbush v. Wallace, 341 
F. Supp. 21 7, 223 (M.D. Ala. 1971 ), a.fl'd without opinion, 405 U.S. 970 (1972). Eleven years later the 
Supreme Court of Alabama granted women the right to have their driver's licenses in their own 
names. The court distinguished Forbush on the ground that the petitioner had inaccurately conceded 
that the common law required her to assume her husband's name upon marriage. State v. Taylor, 
415 So. 2d 1043, 1047 (Ala. 1982). See infra note 134 and accompanying text. See generally Daum, The 
Right of Married Women to Assert Their Own Surnames, 8 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 63 (1974); Karst, A 
Discrimination So Trivial: A Note on the Law and the Symbolism rif Women's Depenrkncy, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 
546 (1974); MacDougall, Women's, Men's, Children's Names: An Outline and Bibliography, 7 FAM. L. 
REP. 4013 (1981); Comment, Surname Alternatives in Pennsylvania, 82 DicK. L. REv. 101 (1977); 
Comment, Women's Name Rights, 59 MARQ. L. REv. 876 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Comment, 
Women's Name Rights]; Comment, Mam.td Women and the Name Game, 11 U. RICH. L. REv. 121 (1976) 
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Name Game]. 
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analytic foundation, courts can thus assess the merits of the 
custodial parent presumption as an alternative to the traditional 
patronymic naming system. 14 
II. DEFINITION OF THE CUSTODIAL PARENT PRE-
SUMPTION 
The primary focus of the custodial parent presumption is 
custody . 15 An implicit proposition of the custodial parent concept is 
that a name is an important factor in the child's development. 16 
Traditionally, courts have regarded the decision to change a child's 
name as a paternal rather than a parental right arising from the 
award of custody. 17 These courts discerned the right to name a 
14. The phrase "patronymic naming system" signifies the perpetuation of the paternal 
preference in naming children. The word patronymic means "a name derived from that of the father 
or a paternal ancestor usually by the addition of a prefix or suffix (as in A-!acDonald, son of Donald, or 
/vanovich, son of Ivan)." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1656 (4th ed. 1976). 
15. In re Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d at 648, 620 P.2d at 584, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 923 (Mosk, J ., 
concurring). A narrow definition of a custodial parent refers to the natural parent who has the legal 
right to custody of the child. See, e.g., L.A.M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827 (Alaska 1976). The L.A.M. 
court found that "a review of literature, including case law, treatise, and law review, indicates 
that ... [one parental right] protected ... by the Constitution ... [is] [t]he right to have a child bear 
the parent's name." /d. at 832 n.13. This right remains even after custody is placed in another. The 
custodial parent's power, however, is not absolute. /d. 
A broader definition is also possible. A stepfather may arguably be a custodial parent because he 
may incur the detriment ofsueeort if the marriage dissolves. See, e.g., Kelley v. Iowa Dep't of Social 
Servs., 197 N.W.2d 192 (Iowa 1972). The Kelley court reasoned that "a step-parent who is living 
with his step-children (in loco parentis) ... is obligated to support them." /d. at 199. For a 
discussion that implicitly recognizes the stepfather's role in rearing - affording rights as well as 
duties, see Blustein, Child Rearing and Family Interests, in HAVING CHILDREN: PHILOSOPHICAL AND 
LEGAL REFLECTIONS ON PARENTHOOD 115-22 ( 1979). The author states: 
[T]he source of child-rearing duties lies not in procreation but in social practices and 
in the legitimate interests of various parties in these practices. 
Legitimate social interests in child-rearing practices include the following: first, 
an interest in the maintenance of a certain level of procreation, and in the physical 
care, education, and socialization of the child; second, an interest in seeing that the 
institutions responsible for carrying out these tasks mesh with other social institutions. 
[The children's duties are] facilitation [of] and non-interference [with] ... the 
[parent's] duties to care for, educate, and socialize their children. 
/d. at 117, 119-20. See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (to be named custodial parent 
upon the mother's death, stepfather must show that he had actually nurtured the children). 
For a discussion of other definitions of custody, see M. MoRGENBESSER & N. NEHLS, joiNT 
CusTODY 27-43 (1981). 
16. Judge Mosk in In re Schiffman, does not attempt to rank the importance of a name but 
recognizes that a name contributes to the child's well-being and adjustment in s0ciety. 28 Cal. 3d at 
648, 620 P.2d at 583, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 923. For discussion of the importance of the parental right to 
name a child, see O'Brien v. Tilson, 523 F. Supp. 494 (E.D.N.C. 1981) (name statute that limits 
parental choice unconstitutionally impinges upon decisions affecting family life, procreation, and 
child-rearing); Jech v. Burch, 466 F. Supp. 714, 719 (D. Hawaii 1979) (parents have a common law 
right to give their child any name they wish, and the fourteenth amendment protects this right from 
arbitrary state action); Rice v. Department of Health and Rehab. Servs., 386 So. 2d 844 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1980) (Booth, J., dissenting) (personal choice is of "great importance"); Secretary of 
Commonwealth v. City Clerk, 373 Mass. 178, 366 N.E.2d 717, 724 (1977) (constitutional right to 
family autonomy protects parents' right to select even a foolish name); D'Ambrosio v. Rizzo, 81 
Mass. App. Ct. 1539, 425 N.E.2d 369 (App. Ct. 1981) (naming of a child is a right and a privilege 
belonging to the child's parents). See also infra note 190. 
17. See, e.g., Carroll v. Johnson, 263 Ark. 280, 565 S. W .2d 10 (1978); In re Spatz, 199 Neb. 332, 
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child as a right different from that of the custodial parent to 
determine the child's environment, education, and religion. 18 
Courts therefore have implied that the naming right is so important 
that it mandates judicial intervention. 19 
A custodial parent, however, is presumed to be a fit parent 
and to act in the child's best interests. 20 This presumption exists 
because at the original determination of custody a court evaluates 
numerous factors in deciding who is to receive the rights and 
responsibilities of a custodial parent. 21 Even if both parents are fit, 
a court nonetheless must choose the parent who will make 
significant decisions about a child's welfare. 22 The decision about a 
child's name should logically be a responsibility incidental to 
custody. 23 An understanding of the custodial parent presumption 
therefore entails an overview of the original custody determination. 
This determination is based on the child's best interest.U There are 
three salient aspects of the child's best interest test-the purpose of 
the test, the factors courts consider, and the relationship of the 
custodial parent presumption to the tender years doctrine. 
A. PuRPOSE oF THE CHILD's BEsT INTEREST TEsT 
In attempting to resolve name disputes, courts frequently 
borrow the words "child's best interests" from custody case law 
and then ascribe a different connotation to these words. 25 Courts 
258 N.W.2d 814 (1977). But see, e.g., Laks v. Laks, 25 Ariz. App. 58,540 P.2d 1277 (Ct. App. 1975) 
(elimination of the inequality between the sexes gives the mother an interest equal to that of the 
father; to recognize only the interest of the father is an impermissible classification based on sex); In 
re Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d 640, 620 P.2d 579, 169 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1980) (Supreme Court of California 
abolished the presumption that the father has a primary right to have his child bear his surname); In 
re Saxton, 309 N. W .2d 298 (Minn. 1981) (neither parent has a superior right to determine the initial 
surname that the child shall bear). 
18. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Jacobs, 309 N .W. 2d 303 (Minn. 1981 )(at birth naming right); Bennett v. 
Northcutt, 544 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976) (name change denied even though the child 
evinced a strong desire for his stepfather's name by using it and even though experts thought use of 
the father's surname might be detrimental). 
19. See, e.g., Cohee v. Cohee, 210 Neb. 855, 317 N.W.2d 381 (1982) (no presumption exists in 
favor of custodial parent); Ex parte Stull, __ S.C. __ , 280 S.E.2d 209 (1981) (action must be 
instituted by guardian ad litem, not custodial parent). 
20. See, e.g., In reSchiffman, 28 Cal. 3d 640, 620 P.2d 579, 169 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1980)(Mosk,J., 
concurring) (the custodial parent presumption is analogous to the presumption arising from 
custody). 
21. Courts use various factors to determine the child's best interest. See infra notes 43-52 and 
accompanying text. 
22. For a discussion of the relationship between the custodial parent's naming right and joint 
custody, see infra notes 220, 224 and accompanying text. 
23. Solomon v. Solomon, 5 Ill. App. 2d 297, __ , 125 N.E.2d 675, 678 (App. Ct. 1955). The 
Solomon court reasoned that a change of name of a minor child of divorced parents is a matter 
incidental to the custody of the child. /d. at __ , 125 N.E.2d at 678. The Solomon decision remained 
unchallenged in Illinois for 25 years, until/n re Larson. Brief for Appellant at 5, In re Larson, No. 80-
849(Ill. App. Ct. Oct. 27, 1980). 
24. Nearly every custody case contains language referring to the child's best interest. H. CLARK, 
DoMESTIC RELATIONS 5 72 n. 2 ( 1968). 
25. See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text. 
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generally interpret the child's best interest m terms of the 
patronymic naming system. 26 
The primary reason for the court's adherence to the 
traditional male preference arises from a common factual pattern. 
The mother, who has custody, seeks to have the child bear the 
stepfather's surname, which she had adopted as her ownY With 
the child in a new environment, courts state that retention of the 
paternal surname will strengthen the "tenuous paternal bond. " 28 
This interpretation thus suggests a dispute between two males, the 
natural father and the stepfather, rather than between the 
noncustodial parent's lack of authority and the custodial parent's 
right to make significant decisions. 29 
Courts preserve the paternal naming right by creating the 
presumption that a name can be changed only when the substantial 
welfare of the child requires it; 30 when the custodial mother 
presents substantial evidence, justifying the change; 31 or when 
there is "clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that such change 
will significantly advance the interests of the child.' ' 32 Only when 
the father abandons33 the child or commits a criminal act that 
denigrates the family name would the father's consent be 
unnecessary. 34 The presumption preserving the male naming right 
therefore seems to place an almost impossible burden upon a 
26. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
27. Attorney Priscilla Ruth MacDougall ranks the frequency of fact patterns in the following 
manner: '' [A J change to the stepfather's name which the mother has adopted as her own, rarely as a 
change to the mother's name, and then in situations where she has not remarried." Appellant's 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States at 28 n.ll, In re Saxton, 309 
N.W.2d 298 (Minn. !981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1737 (1982). These general patterns arise either 
from the mother's filing of a petition in accordance with a statute with the father then opposing, or 
from the child's pursuit of a common law name change, with the noncustodial parent seeking an 
injunction to compel retention of the original surname. Mark v. Kahn, 333 Mass. 517, __ , 131 
N.E.2d 758, 761 (1956). . 
28. See, e.g., Carroll v. Johnson, 265 Ark. 242, 565 S.W.2d 10 (1978) (change could erode 
bond); Mark v. Kahn, 333 Mass. 517, 131 N.E.2d 758 (1956) (if child's name is changed, the 
parental bond may be weakened Or destroyed). 
29. A court's discussion of the paternal bond usually means that it will deny the name change 
because either the divorce has weakened the paternal bond or because the presence of a child support 
payment has strengthened the bond. ~ee, e.g., Robinson v. Hansel, 302 Minn. 34,223 N.W.2d 138 
(1974) (even though a divorce decree terminates a marriage, courts have traditionally tried to 
maintain and encourage continuing parental relationships); In re Harris, 236 S.E.2d 426 (W. Va. 
1977) ("[F]ather who exercises his parental rights has a protectable interest in his children bearing 
his surname and this interest is one quid pro quo of his reciprocal obligation of support and 
maintenance."). 
30. In reSpatz, 199 Ntb. 332,333-34,258 N.W.2d 814,815 (1977). 
31. Norton v. Norton, 268 Ark. 791, 793, 595 S. W .2d 709, 711 (Ct. App. 1980). 
32. In re Harris, 236 S.E.2d 426, 429 (W. Va. 1977). See Laks v. Laks, 25 Ariz. App. 58, 540 
P.2d 1277 (Ct. App. 1975); Degerbergv. McCormick, 4 Del. Ch. 46, 187 A.2d 436 (Del. Ch. 1963); 
Lazow v. Lazow, 147 So. 2d 12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); West v. Wright, 263 Md. 297, 283 A.2d 
40! (1971); In re Robinson, 74 Misc. 2d 63, 344 N.Y.S.2d 147 (Civ. Ct. 1972). The burden of proof 
is even more demanding in adoption cases. See Ward v. Faw, 219 Va. 1120, __ , 253 S.E.2d 658, 
661 (1979). 
33. SeeFlowersv. Cain, 237 S.E.2d Ill (Ya. 1977); InreHarris, 236S.E.2d426(W. Va. 1977). 
34. In reChristjohn, 286 Pa. Super. 112, 428 A.2d 597 (Super. Ct. 1981). 
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mother who determines that a name change would benefit her 
child. 35 Some courts, however, find that the stringent burden of 
proof does not discriminate against women because both parents 
have equal naming rights at a child's birth. 36 These courts fail to 
consider that the origin of the naming preference for the father 
came from the traditional status of the male as head of the 
householdY Consequently, today few couples probably know of 
their naming options. 
The purpose of retaining the paternal surname is sometimes 
linked to the amount of support, usually described in monetary 
terms, 38 that the noncustodial father gives the child. 39 With this 
orientation, courts view the change from the paternal surname as 
one that separates the child from his or her father. 40 This 
interpretation thus implies that change is detrimental to the child. 41 
35. In reSaxton, 309 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1737 (1982). The Saxton 
decision demonstrates a court's reluctance to change a child's paternal name. Both the custodial 
mother and the children, ages seven and nine, wanted to add the maternal surname to the paternal 
surname. Psychologists also thought the hyphenated name would be beneficial to the children's 
mental health. The noncustodial father, who lived in another state and fulfilled child support 
obligations, protested the change, stating that his son was the "only male heir of the Dennis 
surname, as I am an only child and my father is an only child." Appellant's Brief at 36a, In re 
Saxton, 309 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1737 (1982). The Supreme Court of 
Minnesota upheld its standard that the custodial parent must offer clear and compelling evidence 
that the substantial welfare of the child necessitates a change. 309 N. W .2d at 301. Although the court 
stated that the children's preferences should have been considered, as they are in custody 
proceedings, it rejected the constitutional attacks based on the assumption that the paternal name is 
given preference. The court stated that due deference should be given to the fact that the child has 
borne a given name for an extended period of time. !d. at 302. 
The dissent favored the child's best interest standard for hyphenated names. !d. The dissent 
reasoned that ''a change of the minor's surname would be appropriate where the change is beneficial 
for the child, even though the given name is not detrimental to the child's well being." !d. at 303 
(Wahl,J., dissenting). 
36. See, e.g., Cohee v. Cohee, 210 Neb. 855, 317 N.W.2d 381 (1982). In Cohee the Supreme 
Court of Nebraska granted the objecting father's wish to add the paternal name and to place it first in 
the hyphenated name on the birth certificate. The lower court had ordered the mother to amend the 
birth certificate to the surname of the father (Cohee) or to the hyphenated name (Dugger-Cohee). !d. 
at 382. The supreme court considered the naming issue de novo. It found that the father's name 
should be first, offering no explanation for de novo review or for its decision to change the position of 
the father's name. !d. at 384. 
37. Carlsson, Surnames of Married Women and Legitimate Children, 17 N. Y .L.F. 552, 563 (1971 ). 
38. In re Harris, 236 S.E. 2d 426 (W. Va. 1977). The West Virginia court stated: "The weight of 
authority appears to be that absent extreme circumstances a father who exercises his parental rights 
has a protectable interest in his children bearing his surname and this interest is one quid pro quo of his 
reciprocal obligation of support and maintenance.'' /d. at 429. 
39. In D.R.S. v. R.S.H. the dissent criticized the trial court's statement that if the mother 
wanted the child to bear her name, child support payments should be reduced. D.R.S. v. R.S.H., 
__ Ind. App. __ , __ , 412 N.E.2d 1257, 1267 (Ct. App. 1980)(narrowed by J.L.A. v. T.B.S., 
__ Ind. App. __ , 430 N.E.2d 433 (Ct. App. 1982)). The dissent also disliked the following 
statement made by the trial court: "If they want to play women's lib, then let them call it all by 
themselves." /d. See West v. Wright, 263 Md. 297, 283 A.2d 401 ( 1971 ); In re Williams, 86 Misc. 2d 
57,381 N.Y.S.2d994(Civ. Ct. 1976). 
40. Even embarrassment to the child is insufficient to permit a change of the child's surname. 
See Laks v. Laks, 25 Ariz. App. 58, __ , 540 P.2d 1277, 1280 (Ct. App. 1975); Firman v. Firman, 
__ Mont. __ , __ , 610 P.2d 178, 180 (1980); In reSpatz, 199 Neb. 332, __ , 258 N.W.2d 814, 
815 (1977). 
41. Two courts are so against change that they refused to allow even the addition of the 
maternal name to the paternal name. Laks v. Laks, 25 Ariz. App. 58, __ , 540 P.2d 1277, 1280 
(Ct. App. 1975); In re Saxton, 309 N.W.2d 298, 302 (Minn. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1737 
(1982). 
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But such an implication does not arise when a custodial parent 
exercises his or her right to change a child's physical environment, 
educational development, or spiritual orientation. 42 
B. FACTORS CouRTS CoNSIDER IN NAMING DISPUTES 
By discarding the presumption that the father has a primary 
right to have his child bear his name, courts could attempt to 
resolve the naming dispute in terms of the child's best interest 
test. 43 Using this test, courts would consider the child in 
relationship to both parents. 44 In 1980 the Supreme Court of 
California in In re Schiffman45 explicitly advocated the child's best 
interest test in a naming dispute. 46 
In Schiffman the custodial mother appealed an order that 
changed the child's surname from the mother's birth name to the 
father's surnameY The majority opinion explicitly declared that 
the traditional paternal presumption be abolished. 48 The 
concurrence by Judge Mask would recognize a presumption that 
the custodial parent acts in the best interest of a child of tender 
years when selecting a name. 49 
The majority opinion in Schiffman expressly disapproved of its 
earlier decisions that awarded the primary naming right to the 
father. 50 The majority approved the use of certain factors to 
determine the child's best interest in addition to the factor of 
preserving the male naming right. 51 These factors include the 
strength of the mother-child relationship, the identification of the 
42. In re Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d at 649, 620 P. 2d at 585, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 923. 
43. Section 402 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act describes the best interests of a child: 
The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interest of the child. 
The court shall consider all relevant factors including: 
(I) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody; 
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian; 
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or parents, his 
siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best 
interest; 
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and 
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved. 
The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does not affect 
the relationship of the child. 
UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT§ 402 (1976). 
44. A court's acceptance of the tender years doctrine, however, affects how the court evaluates 
both parents. See infra notes 79-93 and accompanying text. 
45. 28Cal. 3d640, 620P.2d579, 169Cal. Rptr. 918(1980). 
46./n reSchiffman, 28 Cal. 3d 640,648,620 P.2d 579,584, 169 Cal. Rptr. 918,923 (1980). 
47./d. at641-42, 620 P.2d at580, 169 Cal. Rptr. at919. 
48. !d. at647,620P.2dat583, 169Cal. Rptr. at922. 
49. /d. at648, 620 P.2d at584-85, 169 Cal. Rptr. at923. 
50. !d. at647, 620 P.2d at583, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 922. 
51. !d. at647, 620 P.2d at583, 169 Cal. Rptr. at922-23. 
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child as part of a family unit, and the embarrassment or discomfort 
that a child may experience when he bears a surname different 
from that of the rest of his familyY An additional factor involves 
the balancing of the symbolic role that a surname other than that of 
the natural father may play in fostering familial bonds against the 
importance of maintammg the biological father-child 
relationship. 53 These factors thus lessen the primacy of the paternal 
naming right because the court reduced the paternal right to a 
factor, not the factor. The court must also consider the bonds 
between the child and his or her mother, siblings, and stepfather if 
they are a part ofthe family unit. 54 
Concurring Judge Mask, however, views these factors as 
having been considered previously at the custody determination55 
and finds the naming right to be an incident of custody. 56 A 
custodial parent's decision about a name would be "just one in a 
long list of ingredients contributing more or less to the child's well-
being and adjustment in society.'' 57 
When declaring that the custodial parent presumptively acts in 
the child's best interest, Judge Mask, without any elaboration, 
states that the general function of the custodial parent presumption 
is to maintain the status quo. 58 Two contrasting definitions of status 
quo are possible. One interpretation is that to change a child's 
name alters the status quo by the very fact of change. This 
interpretation suggests two different strengths of presumptions. 
First, the custodial parent would presumptively have the right to 
select a name and the noncustodial parent would have to overcome a 
heavy burden because mere selection does not alter the status 
quo. 59 Second, the custodial parent would presumptively have the 
right to change a name but the noncustodial parent, generally the 
father, 60 could easily rebut the presumption because a change of the 
52. !d. 
53. !d. 
54. !d. at 648,620 P.2d at 584, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 923 (Mosk,J.; concurring). 
55. !d. 
56. !d. In Solomon v. Solomon the Illinois Appellate Court used the phrase "incidental to the 
custody of the child" to describe its jurisdiction. Solomon v. Solomon, 5 Ill. App. 2d 297, 301,125 
N.E.2d 675, 678 (Ct. App. 1955). Other state courts have considered significant the fact that one 
parent has custody. SuWebberv. Parker, 167 So. 2d 519 (La. Ct. App.) (to select given name), writ 
rifused, 264 La. 886, 168 So. 2d 269 (1964); State ex rei Spence-Chapin Servs. to Families & Children 
v. Tedeno, 101 Misc. 2d485, 421 N.Y.S.2d297(Sup. Ct. 1979)(toselectsurname). 
57. 28 Cal. 3d at 648, 620 P .2d at 584, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 923 (Mosk, J., concurring). 
58. !d. at 650, 620 P.2d at 585, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 924. 
59. The Supreme Court of Nebraska recently recognized that neither parent has a superior right 
to determine the initial name. Cohee v. Cohee, 210 Neb. 855, __ , 317 N.W.2d 381, 384 (1982). 
See Jacobs v. Jacobs, 309 N.W.2d 303, 305 (Minn. 1981). A statutory preference for the paternal 
name was declared unconstitutional in both North Carolina and Hawaii. See O'Brien v. Tilson, 523 
F. Supp. 494,497 (E. D. N.C. 1981);Jech v. Burch, 466 F. Supp. 714,721 (D.C. Hawaii 1979). 
60. In 1980 women headed single family households almost five times more often than did men. 
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child's previous ·name would alter the status quo. 61 Courts would 
interpret these two presumptions in light of their general view of 
presumptions. 62 
The facts of Schiffman63 suggest this presumptive weighing. 64 In 
Schiffman the couple separated after six months of marriage and a 
child was born five months later. The court noted that in this 
situation the factor of how long a child had borne the father's name 
was insignificant. 65 The logical inference is that this factor would be 
significant in a name change proceeding. Therefore, the weight 
ascribed to the father's naming right would be strengthened 
because such a name change symbolizes an alteration of the status 
quo. 66 The rationale for the dichotomy - naming at birth and 
name changing- is unclear. 67 
To avoid this illogical interpretation, a court must therefore 
define maintenance of the status quo, not in terms of how long a 
child had a particular surname, but rather in terms of maintaining 
61. See, e.g., In reSaxton, 309 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. 1981) (court gave great weight to the child's 
previous use of a surname, regardless of whose surname was originally given), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 
1737 (1982); In re Tubbs, 620 P.2d 384 (Okla. 1980) (every divorced parent whose paternal or 
maternal bond remains unsevered has a claim to his or her child continuing to bear the same legal 
name as that by which it was known at the time the marriage was dissolved). 
Whether couples know of the option to use a name other than the father's surname is unclear. 
To make known the common law right to change one's name, a state attorney general has issued an 
opinion stating that a husband has the common law right to adopt his wife's surname upon marriage. 
Appellant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States at 23 n.8, In re 
Saxton, 309 N.W.2d 298(Minn. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1737 (1982). 
62. The evidentiary effect of the custodial parent presumption would depend upon state law. See 
generally Note, Presumptions According to Purpose, 45 ALB. L. REv. 1079 (1981 ). 
The custodial parent presumption, based on the recognition of •he child's best interests, is a 
presumption founded on the right of a parent to care for a child, not on procedure nor on probability. 
!d. at 1090·91. Underlying the custodia! parent concept is the importance of maintaining the status 
quo, which involves recognition of the custodial parent's right to make decisions about a child's 
welfare and protection of the child's welfare by deterring quarreling parents from litigating. See supra 
notes 58·61 and accompanying text. 
These reasons have significance only if the court interprets the presumption as having the effect 
of a Morgan presumption, not of a Thayer presumption. The Thayer theory of presumptions 
employs the metaphor of a bursting bubble to explain the procedural effect. The presumption exists 
when a party establishes the fact that allows the presumption of the presumed fact. The opposing 
party, however, bursts the presumption when offering any evidence that contradicts the 
presumption. Seej. WIGMORE, 9 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE§ 2493a, at 309·23 (1981). The Morgan 
theory of presumptions preserves the presumption for the fact· finder even if the opposing party offers 
cogent evidence attacking the validity of the presumption. !d. at 315-16. 
A Morgan interpretation, therefore, would shift the burden of persuasion to the noncustodial 
parent. A Thayer interpretation would cause the presumption to disappear when the noncustodial 
parent offered any evidence. The important reasons underlying the custodial parent concept may 
justify not considering the trend of a majority of states to adopt the Thayer theory. See Annat., 5 
A.L.R. 3o 39-44 (1966 & Supp. 1980). 
63. In re Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d 640, 620 P. 2d 579, 169 Cal. Rptr. 918 ( 1980). 
64. !d. at 642, 620 P.2d at 580, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 919. 
65. !d. at 647,620 P.2d at 583, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 922. 
66. !d. 
67. A recent Note discerned that a distinction between naming at birth and name changing may 
occur if a court purports to assert the importance of the child's best interest while in effect 
recognizing the predominance of the paternal right: 
[l]t seems ironic that while the child's surname is regarded as unimportant in 
estab/isMng his relationship with his natural father, it would seem to be considered 
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the custodial parent's right to make decisions regarding the care of 
the child. 68 Maintenance of the status quo would thus refer to the 
custodial parent's right to make a decision, not to maintaining a 
static environment for the child. Judge Mosk suggests that the 
"accustomed environment," controlled by the custodial parent, is 
in the child's best interest. 69 The noncustodial parent's right thus 
exists when he or she can show "new facts and circumstances 
subsequent to the original custody order" 70 that signify that the 
custodial parent does not act in the child's best interest. Judge 
Mosk explains this rebuttable presumption by referring to the 
noncustodial parent's right to object to the religious training of a 
child. 71 Because the custodial parent presumptively acts_ in the 
child's best interest, the noncustodial parent must overcome the 
heavy burden of proving that the "health or well-being of the child 
is being injured by the choice of religious practices.' ' 72 
Legal antecedents, described in a statute and in case law, 
further explain the custodial parent presumption. 73 A Pennsylvania 
statute expressly describes the custodial parent's right to select a 
name at birth: ''If the parents are divorced or separated at the time 
of the child's birth, the choice of the surname rests with the parent 
who has custody.'' 74 The appellate court of Louisiana expressed a 
similar view in declaring that the noncustodial father bore the 
burden of proving that the given name, rather than the surname, 
was "detrimental to the present or future welfare of a child" who 
was born pending a suit for the parents' separation. 75 A clear 
statement that the custody of an infant is an important factor was 
made by a superior court of New York: "[T]he significant 
consideration is that the mother has custody and it is she who will 
be the primary caretaking figure and who will make major 
crucial in retaining his relationship with his father after his parents' marriage has 
broken down. Unless this difference can be explained on the basis that in the latter 
case the child has identified himself as a member of his father's family and that it 
would be psychologically damaging and therefore contrary to his best interests if this 
was disturbed as a result of a change of surname, it is difficult to see a reason for the 
distinction. 
Note, ChangeofChild'sName, 97 L.Q. REv. 197, 200(1981). 
68. See, e.g., In re Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d at 649, 620 P.2d at 585, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 925 (Mosk, 
J., concurring). 
69. !d. 
70. !d. 
71. !d. 
72. !d. 
73. See gene>ally H. HILL KAY, SEx BASED DISCRIMINATION 171-77 (2d ed. 1981) (examines 
relationship of father's primary right, the child's best interest test, and the custodial parent 
presumption). 
74. PA. STAT. tit. 28, § 1.7(b)(1975). 
75. Webber v. Parker, 167 So. 2d 519, 522 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 246 La. 886, 168 So. 2d 
269 (1964). See In re M.L.P., 621 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981) (upheld custodial parent's 
preference for given name). 
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decisions" for the child. 76 In this case the court also considered the 
child's wishes, 77 a common factor in custody suits. The court 
presumed that the child would prefer to use the name of the parent 
with whom she was living. 78 
The custodial parent presumption thus accords with a court's 
award of custody by affording the custodial parent the same 
presumptive right to select or change a child's name as it does with 
respect to the right to select or change a child's religion, education, 
or general environment. A court's view of the custodial parent 
presumption will thus logically relate to its approach to the 
awarding of custody. 
C. RELATIONSHIP OF THE CusTODIAL PARENT 
PRESUMPTION To THE TENDER YEARS DocTRINE 
When a court determines a child's best interest in a custody or 
name change proceeding, its perception of the child's best interest 
relates to its view of the tender years doctrine because both legal 
concepts deal with related but distinct presumptions. The 
presumption of the tender years doctrine is that if both parents of a 
young child are fit, the mother is the better custodial parent. 79 A 
court's view of this maternal presumption must be distinguished 
from its interpretation of the gender neutral custodial parent 
presumption. 
In Devine v. DevineB0 the Supreme Court of Alabama held the 
tender years presumption to be an unconstitutional gender based 
classification that discriminates between father and mother solely 
on the basis of sex. 81 In making the custody determination gender 
neutral, the court lists factors to be considered in awarding custody. 
These factors are similar to those that courts have considered in 
resolving naming disputes: 
The sex and age of the children are indeed very important 
considerations; however, the courts must go beyond these 
to consider the characteristics and needs of each child, 
including their emotional, social, moral, material and 
educational needs; the respective home environments 
76. State ex rei Spence-Chapin Servs. to Families & Children v. Tedeno, 101 Misc. 2d 485, 
_,421 N.Y.S.2d297,300(Sup.Ct.l979). 
77. !d. at_, 421 N.Y.S.2dat300. 
78. /d. 
79. Uviller, supra note 5, at 113-14. 
80. 398So. 2d686(Ala. 1981). 
81. Devine v. Devine, 398 So. 2d 686,695 (Ala. 1981). 
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offered by the parties; the characteristics of those seeking 
custody, including age, character, stability, mental and 
physical health; the capacity and interest of each parent to 
provide for the emotional, social, moral, material and 
educational needs of the children; the interpersonal 
relationship between each child and each parent; the 
interpersonal relationship between the children; the effect 
on the child of disrupting or continuing an existing 
custodial status; the preference of each child, if the child is 
of sufficient age and maturity; the report and 
recommendation of any expert witnesses or other 
independent investigator; available alternatives; and any 
other relevant matter the evidence may disclose. 82 
In listing these factors the court notes that the common law origin 
of "the tender years presumption and the best interests of the child 
[doctrine] have grown side by side. " 83 Therefore, courts have 
presumed that the child's best interest means that the mother 
should be the custodial parent. 84 Because of this historical 
relationship the custodial parent presumption would be suspect in 
those states that have not expressly abandoned or abolished the 
tender years doctrine, 85 but only if those states failed to recognize 
two important facts. 
First, courts have traditionally interpreted the child's best in-
terest in terms of the paternal naming right. 86 This discriminatory 
practice of preserving the patronymic naming system was the 
impetus for the Schiffman court's declaration that the child's best 
82. !d. at 696-97. See Johnson v. Johnson, 564 P.2d 71 (Alaska 1977); In reMarriage of Bowen, 
219 N.W.2d683 (Iowa 1974); Christensen v. Christensen, 191 Neb. 355,215 N.W.2d Ill (1974). 
83. Devine, 398 So. 2d at 696 n.8. 
84. !d. 
85. !d. at 691 n.4. The Devine court lists the following states as those retaining the tender years 
doctrine: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, 
Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Texas, and Washington. The validity of the doctrine is questionable in the following states: Kansas, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Vermont. !d. at 691 n.5. Even in those states where there is a state's 
equal right amendment or similar statutory language, the presumption remains valid: Louisiana, 
Maryland, Minnesota, and Utah. !d. at 691 n.6. In the following 22 states the doctrine remains in 
some form: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Idaho, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, 
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, 
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. !d. 
at 691 n.3. But see, e.g., Uviller, supra note 5, at 114 (author interprets statutory silence on the subject 
as an implied statement that the best interests of the child govern). Uviller, contrary to what she 
believes are feminist views, supports the use of the maternal presumption, finding that the economic 
context of custody suits will severely disadvantage women if the presumption is declared 
unconstitutional. !d. at 117. 
The presumption may be constitutional from the viewpoint of the United States Supreme 
Court. See Arends v. Arends, 517 P.2d 1019, 1020 (Utah 1974) (custodial father of a one-year-old 
girl whose mother had been psychotic was forced to relinquish custody to the mother who had 
recovered when the child was four years old), cerl. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1975). 
86. Note, supra note 12, at 323. 
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interest test means considering the child's best interests, not just the 
paternal preferenceY In practice, courts did not relate the child's 
best interests in resolving naming disputes to the pnor 
determination of custody, even though ''the tender years 
presumption and the best interests of the child have grown side by 
side.' ' 88 
The other important fact courts must recognize is that the 
gender neutral language of the custodial parent presumption does 
not violate the equal protection clause89 of the United States 
Constitution. 90 If the custodial parent presumption were 
legislatively adopted91 or judicially promulgated the language of the 
presumption would be facially neutral. 92 Even though the 
presumption would adversely affect men because courts 
infrequently award custody to fathers, the classification does not 
intentionally discriminate against men. 93 The classification does 
not meet the "but for" test that signifies the presence of 
discriminatory intent. 94 Deference to the custodial parent's 
decision is not a euphemism for giving control to the mother. 95 
Such deference simply recognizes the custodial parent's right to 
make an important decision. 96 
In conclusion, the right to select or change a child's name 
logically coexists with other custodial rights. 97 To resolve the 
naming dispute, a court need not reevaluate the traditional factors 
comprising the child's best interest test because the award of 
custody creates the presumption that the custodial parent's decision 
is in the child's best interest. The noncustodial parent thus must 
bear the burden of proving facts to show a change of conditions 
subsequent to the original court determination of custody. The 
rebuttable character of the custodial parent presumption, though 
allowing judicial intervention upon a showing of significant facts, 
87. In re Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d at 647, 620 P .2d at 583, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 922 ( 1980). 
88. Devine v. Devine, 398 So. 2d 686, 696 n.8 (Ala. 1981). 
89. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. Section 1 states: "No state shall ... deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.'' I d. 
90. See generally Note, Discriminatory Purpose and Disproportionate Impact: An Assessment After ''Feeny, '' 
79 CoLUM. L. REv. 1376 (1979) (heavy burden to show an equal protection violation). 
91. See, e.g., PA. ADMIN. ConE§ 1.7(b) (Shepard's 1975) (codifies custodial parent's right to 
name a newborn child). · 
92. Even a state disability program that excludes coverage for pregnancy did not violate the 
equal protection clause. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (program divides recipients into 
the groups of "pregnant women" and "nonpregnant persons"). 
93. The classification of custodial and noncustodial parent created by the presumption does not 
bar the father from naming the child because the father can be the custodial parent. Personnel Adm' r 
v. Feeny, 422 U.S. 256 (1979); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
94. See Feeny, 442 U.S. at 279. 
95. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
96. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text. 
97. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. 
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maintains the status quo by protecting the custodial parent's right 
to make important legal decisions about a child's development. 
III. THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF A NAME 
Parental disputes about a child's name suggest the significance 
of a name, 98 although the basis of the disagreement could be 
acrimony between former spouses. 99 Judge Mask recognizes the 
naming decision to be a significant decision. 100 Various aspects of a 
name reveal the basis of this assumption: The common law and 
statutory mechanisms provide means for effectuating the family's 
right to select its members names. 101 
A. CoMMON LAw AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATIONs oF 
NAMING 
The essence of a common law name change is the consistent 
use of a name, absent a fraudulent or deceitful motive. 102 This right 
extends not only to adults but also to children. 103 This broad basis 
for a name change continues today when courts hold that there is 
no property interest in a name, 104 that a person's name need not be 
98. Judge Mosk related the significance of a name decision to aspects of a child's well-being. In 
re Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d at 648, 620 P.2d at 584, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 923 (Mosk, J., concurring). 
99. To protect the child's best interest some observers have argued that the custodial parent 
should be sole arbiter of the noncustodial parent's visitation rights. See J. GoLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. 
SoLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST iNTERESTS OF THE CHILD 38 (1973). [n examining the tender years 
doctrine, however, author Uviller believes that this proposal would "be strong incentive to yet 
bloodier battles over which parents get custody in the first place." Uviller, supra note 5, at 117 n.29. 
Acceptance of the custodial parent presumption may similarly, but to a lesser extent, heighten the 
conflict in the original custody determination. 
I 00. In re Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d at 648, 620 P. 2d at 584, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 923. 
101. One writer has suggested that the court may find that the decision to select or change a 
name is so significant that, even if the custodial parent presumptively acts in the child's best interest, 
the court is the only proper forum for a name change, requiring a statute that abrogates the common 
law right to change one's name at will, absent a fraudulent or illegal motive. Comment, Name Game, 
supra note 13, at 150-51. But this view fails to account for the constitutionally protected right to 
family autonomy. See irifi'a notes 190-201 and accompanying text. 
The government may assert that it can restrict the selection of a name if the name is unduly 
lengthy. See, e.g., Grand Forks Herald, June 4, 1982, at 3B (Kansas County Court denied petition 
for the name ''Xartheonadjimadurokaszamnoupoulos' '). 
102. Ex parte Snook, 2 Hilt. Rep. 566 (N.Y. 1859). See Smith v. Casualty Co., 197 N.Y. 420, 90 
N.E. 947 (1910) (the name a person assumes, uses, and becomes known by "will constitute his legal 
name just as much as if he had borne it from birth"); Comment, Name Game, supra note 13, at 142-60 
(analysis of how courts have interpreted the common law and statutes). See generally Dwight, Proper 
Names, 20 YALE L.J. 387 ( 1911 ); Gordon, Change of Patronymic, 56 CAN. L.J. I ( 1920). 
103. In re Staros, .280 N. W.2d 409, 411 (Iowa 1979). The Staros court emphasized that the 
California court in In re Trower, 260 Cal. App. 2d 75, 66 Cal. Rptr. 873 (Ct. App. 1968), failed to 
supply any authority for the proposition that at common law a minor did not have a nght to a name 
change. 280 N.W.2d at 411. See Burk v. Hammonds, 586 S.W.2d 307 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (child 
may exercise common law right, but statutory right is vested in parent); Hall v. Hall, 30 Md. 214, 
351 A.2d 917 (1976) (minor has right to common law and statutory name change, but court 
determines child's best interest in statutory proceedings). 
104. Hosmer v. Hosmer, 611 S.W.2d 32 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (a name cannot be consideration 
for an antenuptial contract, for there is no legal right to preclude the giving of a paternal surname to 
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the exclusive name, 105 or that a statute provides court docu-
mentation of a name change as an alternative to the common law 
method. 106 
A statute abrogates the broad common law right when a court 
recognizes a liberty interest in a person's name 107 and declares that 
the statute is the exclusive method for a name change. 108 One 
writer has suggested that the apparent level of discretion exercised 
by a court signifies its interpretation of statutes in relationship to 
the common law: minimum, when the only basis for denial is 
fraud; 109 intermediate, when the court considers other factors; 110 
and maximum, when the court requires a showing of ''good 
cause.'' 111 
These different levels of discretion could affect a court's 
interpretation of the custodial parent presumption. A court could 
superimpose its level of discretion upon the weighing of the 
presumption favoring the custodial parent: a minimal level of 
discretion could give strength to the presumption, almost creating 
categorical protection for the custodial parent's decision; and a 
maximum level of discretion could weaken the presumption, 
creating a balancing process, with the presumption characterized as 
a thumb on the scale of the custodial parent. 112 
In addition to the burden of proof suggested by statutes, 113 a 
court may discern a heavy burden of proof for a noncustodial , 
parent seeking an injunction or other extraordinary relief. 114 The 
a child). But see In re Douglas, 60 Misc. 2d 1057, 304 N.Y. S.2d 558 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (common law 
would not recognize a one·word name, such as "Arindam"). 
105. See Secretary of Commonwealth v. City Clerk, 373 Mass. 178, 366 N.E.2d 717 (1977) 
Oane Doe, who marries Richard Roe, may be Jane Roe and Mrs. Richard Roe, or a different 
name); People v. Briggins, 50 N.Y.2d 302, 406 N.E.2d 766, 428 N.Y.S.2d 909 (1980) (husband 
allowed to use a different name on a bank account to hide money from his wife). See also Note, 
Surname Alternatives in Pennsylvania, 82 DicK. L. REv. I 0 I, II 0-13 ( 1977)(common law right to use two 
surnames). 
106. Comment, Name Game, supra note 13, at 144 (a method for a quick and efficient name 
change). 
I 07. Arnold, Personal Names, 15 YALE L.J. 227, 230-31 ( 1905). See, Comment, Name Game, supra 
note 13, at 145 (a vociferous minority of jurisdictions interpret statutes as an abrogation of the 
common law). 
108. Comment, Name Game, supra note 13, at 145-49. Some implied requirements arising from 
the abrogation· of the common law might be a showing that a change of name would not be 
detrimental to the family unit, that a spouse consents, or that administrative burdens will not be 
undue. Comment, Name Game, supra note 13, at 154-60. 
109. Comment, Name Game, supra note 13, at 150-51. 
110. Comment, Name Game, supra note 13, at 151-54 (factors include no evidence of harm, an 
unopposed petition, and burden of proof on objecting third parties). 
111. See, e.g., In re Mohlman, 26 N.C. App. 220, 216 S.E.2d 147 (Ct. App. 1975) (desire for 
change is insufficient reason). 
112. For an explanation of the protection afforded by categorical protection and by balancing, 
see generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw§ 12, at 576-736 (1978). 
113. A court may, however, deny a name change pursuant to a divorce statute, but grant a 
name change pursuant to a general name statute. Ogle v. Circuit Court, 89 S.D. 18, __ , 227 
N.W.2d 621,623 (1975). 
114. See generally Annat., 92 A.L.R. 3o 1091, 1123-26 (1979) (injunction, mandamus, and 
extraordinary relief). 
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extraordinary nature of an injunction could suggest that a court 
would give great weight to the custodial parent presumption. 
A court will also interpret the presumption in light of the 
family's interest in naming because the custodial parent 
presumption describes a relationship between the custodial parent 
and child and suggests a limited right in the noncustodial parent. 
B. THE FAMILY'S INTEREST IN A NAME 
The court in resolving the naming dispute between two 
parents may base its decision on how the law has recognized 
various interests related to the family. Litigation concerning family 
members has recognized four rights: 115 the husband-father's right 
to his own name, the wife-mother's right to her own name, 116 the 
paternal and maternal right to due process and equal protection, 
and the parental right to name a child. How a court relates these 
familial rights to the unit consisting of the custodial parent and 
child logically depends upon the court's interpretation of what 
constitutes ''a family.'' 
1. The Husband-Father's Right to His Own Name 
At common law there was no interest in a name because a 
person could change his name absent a fraudulent purpose. 117 But a 
husband would sometimes adopt his wife's surname to receive a 
substantial inheritance. 118 Today a husband may be unsuccessful in 
asserting the exclusive right to his own name after a divorce. 119 In 
115. The child's interest in his or her name is generally given some consideration, but the child's 
preferences are not controlling. In re Saxton, 309 N.W.2d 298, 302 (Minn. !981), cert. denied, 10~ S. 
Ct. 1737 (1982). 
116. The Center for a Woman's Own Name stated that its position was that "the name(s) the 
woman chooses to use is her own name. It may be the name given, a name assumed during 
childhood, assumed at marriage, assumed at a previous marriage, a hyphenated name as in a name 
made up by herself at any time." CENTER FOR A WoMAN's OwN NAME, BooKLET FOR WoMEN WHo 
WtsH TO DETERMINE THEIR OwN NAME AFTER MARRIAGE 6 ( 1974 ). See also In re Schiffman, 28 Cal. 
3d 640, 620 P.2d 579, 169 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1980) (court used the expression "birthname" in 
substitution for the traditional label of "maiden name"). But see Secretary of Commonwealth v. City 
Clerk, 373 Mass. 178, __ , 366 N .E.2d 717, 724 ( 1977) (maiden name "is the name used before her 
first marriage"). Author Susan Ross interprets a woman's name in terms of patronymic naming: 
The author finally decided on "father's name" because she wished to emphasize that 
most people in our society still give their children the surname of the father. Many 
feminists have been combatting the custom of a woman's changing her name to that of 
the husband at marriage, but they have ignored the male-oriented system for naming 
children. By using the term "father's name," the author hopes to encourage more 
women to see and combat the second problem. 
S. Ross, THE RtGHT oF WoMEN 254 n.1 (1973). 
117./nreSnook, 2 Hilt. Rep. 566, 568(N.Y. Ct. C.P. 1859). 
118. See Comment, Name Game, supra note !3, at 127 n.41. 
119. See, e.g., Welcker v. Welcker, 342 So. 2d 251 (La. Ct. App. !977) (ex-husband could not 
bar his ex-wife from using his surname even though they had been married less than a year). 
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such a case a court reveals the continuing vitality of the common 
law when granting, over objection, an ex-wife the right to use her 
ex-husband's name120 and when recognizing a wife's right to name 
her children by a previous marriage. 121 
2. The Wife-Mother's Right to Her Own Name 
In contrast, the issue of a wife's right to use her own name, 122 
rather than her husband's, demands a more thorough discussion of 
the various situations in which courts gradually recognized this 
right. 123 The term "lucy stoner" 124 signifies the onset of the 
movement toward recognition of this right. In 1855 Lucy Stone 
retained her birth name when she married Henry B. Blackwell. 125 
Her influence later promptedjane Grant and Ruth Hale in 1921 to 
found the Lucy Stone League. 126 
In the 1970s the interest in women's names heightened when 
the Supreme Court of the United States, in Forbush v. Wallace, 127 
upheld Alabama's regulation requiring a woman to register for her 
driver's license using her husband's surname. 128 The Court, 
affirming per curiam, found the regulation to be rationally related 
to the state's interest in custom, uniformity, and administrative 
convenience. 129 Five years later, the district court of Kentucky in 
Whitlow v. Hodges130 found Forbush to be persuasive and upheld 
Kentucky's unwritten regulation that required a woman to use her 
husband's name to receive a driver's license. 131 The Supreme 
Court of the United States denied certiorari. 132 In 1982, however, 
120. Cowley v. Cowley, 1901 A.C. 450 (House of Lords allowed the ex-wife of Lord Cowley the 
right to be known as "Cowley" even though she had remarried). 
121. Winkenhofer v. Griffin, 511 S.W.2d 216 (Ky. Ct. App. 1974) (Kentucky court rejected the 
stepfather's claim that a name change will insinuate to the public that the child was his illegitimate 
child). See generally In reDunston, 18 N.C. App. 647, 197 S.E.2d 560(Ct. App. 1973)(court allowed 
the name change for a child who had been known for 15 years by her unwed father's name). 
122. See generally Daum, supra note 13; Lamber, A Married Woman's Surname: Is Custom Lawi, 1973 
WASH. U.L.Q. 779; Comment, Women's Name Rights, supra note 13, at 876; Comment, Name Game, 
supra note 13, at 142. 
123. See supra note 13. 
124. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1344 (4th ed. 1976) (defines a "lucy 
stoner" as "a female advocate of women's rights; esp: a married woman who uses her maiden name 
as a surname''). 
125. MacDougall, Married Women's Common Law Right to Their Own Surnames, I WoMEN's RIGHTS 
L. REP. 2, 5 (1972). 
126. !d. 
127.341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala. 1971), a.fl'dpercuriam, 405 U.S. 970(1972). 
128. Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217,223 (M.D. Ala. 1971), a.ff'dpercuriam, 405 U.S. 970 
(1972). 
129. 341 F. Supp. at 222. These interests, however, have not withstood judicial scrutiny when 
the court discerns gender discrimination. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971) (rejected 
state's claim of administrative ease). 
130.539 F.2d 582 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976). 
131. Whitlow v. Hodges, 539 F.2d 582, 583-84 (6th Cir. ), cert. denied, 429 U.S. I 029 (1976). 
132. 539 F.2d at 583-84. 
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the Supreme Court of Alabama133 overruled Forbush, declaring that 
Forbush did not accurately state the broad right to a common law 
name change. 134 
The Forbush and Whitlow decisions of the 1970s did not, 
however, preclude women from using their names in this context 
and others. Other courts interpreted their state common law and 
held that the common law did not require a married woman to 
assume her husband's name. 135 Therefore, by finding their 
common law different from Alabama's, state courts have 
recognized a woman's right to retain her name upon marriage. 136 
A few months after Forbush, the Maryland Court of Appeals 
recognized a woman's right to register to vote using her own 
name, 137 and the Arkansas statutory requirement of registering as 
''Ms.'' or ''Mrs.'' was later declared unconstitutional. 138 Courts 
soon recognized a woman's right to use her birth name in a variety 
of contexts: the right to confirm her decision with a court order, 139 
the right to resume her name after having previously used her 
husband's, 140 the right to use general name change statutes even if 
divorce laws bar change, 141 the right to register for group 
insurance, 142 the right to obtain a driver's license, 143 and the right 
133. State v. Taylor, 415 So. 2d 1043 (Ala. 1982). 
134. !d. at 1047. The Taylor court quoted Kruzel v. Podell, 67 Wis. 2d 138, 226 N.W.2d 458 
(1975), for an accurate statement of the common law right: 
When a woman on her marriage assumes, as she usually does in England ... the 
surname of her husband in substitution for her father's name, it may be said that she 
acquires a new name by repute .... The change of name is in fact, rather than in law, 
a consequence of the marriage. 
415 So. 2d at 1047. 
The Taylor decision also undermines the holding of Whitlow, 539 F.2d 582 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 
429 U.S. 1029 (1976), because the Whitlow court adopted the Forbush court's rationale. Whitlow, 593 
F.2d at 583-84. See Memorandum, Kv. DEPT. TRANSP. (Oct. 30, 1981) (Kentucky Department of 
Transportation allowed to issue driver's licenses to married women in their own names). 
135. See, e.g., Kruzel v. Podell, 67 Wis. 2d 138, 226 N.W.2d 458 (1975) (court did not mention 
Alabama and Kentucky's unusual interpretation of the common law). 
136. See, e.g., In re Natale, 527 S.W.2d 402, 406-07 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (right to resume 
birth name after using husband's surname). 
137. Stuart v. Board of Supervisors, 266 Md. 440, 295 A.2d 223 (1972) (Maryland Court of 
Appeals held that the statute requiring the filing of former and present names changed by marriage 
did not abrogate the common law). See generally MacDougall, supra note 125. 
138. Walker v.Jackson, 391 F. Supp. 1395 (E.D. Ark. 1975). 
139. E.g., Kruzel v. Podell, 67 Wis. 2d 138, __ , 226 N.W.2d 458, 466 (1975). 
140. In re Hauptly, 262 Ind. 150, __ , 312 N.E.2d 857,860 (1974); In re Natale, 527 S.W.2d 
402, 407 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975). 
141. Ogle v. Circuit Court, 89 S.D. 18, 23, 227 N.W.2d 621,624-25 (1975); In re Harris, 236 
S.E.2d426,430(W. Va.1977). 
142. Kruzel v. Podell, 67 Wis. 2d 138, __ , 226 N.W.2d 458, 466 (1975). The Wisconsin court 
explicitly rejected the 1945 Illinois case ofRago v. Lipsky, 327111. App. 63,63 N.E.2d 642 (App. Ct. 
1945). Kruzel, 67 Wis. 2d at 146, 226 N. W.2d at 462. The Rago court had held that at common law a 
married woman must use her husband's name as her own. Rago, 327 Ill. App. at __ , 63 N.E.2d at 
644. In 1974 the Attorney General of Illinois had repudiated Rago by issuing two opinions which 
recognized a married woman's right to vote and to drive using her own name. 5 Op. Att'y Gen. Ill. 
695 (Feb. 13, 1974); 5 Op. Au'yGen. Ill. 711 (Feb. 25, 1974). 
143. Davis v. Roos, 326 So. 2d 226, 229 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Traugott v. Petit, __ R.I. 
_, _, 404 A.2d 77, 80 (1979). 
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to sue for a divorce in a surname different from the husband's. 144 
These rights accrued to a woman as a wife or as an ex-wife. 145 
Some courts have similarly interpreted a woman's right to her 
own name as an individual right, regardless of her status as a 
mother. 146 Yet, this perspective may assume that the mother acts in 
the child's best interest when deciding to use her birth name. 147 
The right of a mother or father, a wife or a husband, to her or 
his own name is thus as broad as the courts' interpretation of the 
common law and statutes. 148 Litigation in the 1970s reveals that the 
common law and statutes protected a woman's right to her name 
during a marriage. Within the marriage each spouse had a right to 
his or her name. The interpretation of common law also supported 
recognition of a woman's right to continue to use her husband's 
name that she had adopted as her own even after a divorce. 149 
3. The Paternal and Maternal Right to Due Process and Equal 
Protection 
When divorce involves a family of three or more150 or when a 
father acknowledges paternity, 151 courts have analyzed the paternal 
and maternal rights involved in the legal proceedings for a child's 
name change. 152 
144. Malone v. Sullivan, 124 Ariz. 469, __ , 605 P.2d 447,650 (1980); Weathers v. Superior 
Court, 54 Cal. App. 3d 286, 289, 126 Cal. Rptr. 547, 549 (Ct. App. 1976); Simmons v. O'Brien, 
201 Neb. 778, __ , 272 N.W.2d 273, 274 (1978). 
145. The woman's right to her own name appeared as an individual right based on the common 
law freedom to choose a name absent fraudulent purpose. MacDougall, supra note 125, at 3. 
146. In re Darks, 98 Ill. App. 3d 1046, __ , 425 N .E.2d 49, 49 (App. Ct. 1981); Klein v. Klein, 
36 Md. App. 177, __ , 373 A.2d 86, 89 (Ct. Spec. App. 1977); Piotrowski v. Piotrowski, 71 Mich. 
App. 213, __ , 247 N.W.2d 354, 356 (Ct. App. 1976); Moskowitz v. Moskowitz, 118 N.H. 199, 
__ , 385 A.2d 120, 123 (1978); Egnerv. Egner, 133 N.J. Super. 403, __ , 337 A.2d 46,49 (Sup. 
Ct. App. Div. 1975); Meadows v. Meadows, 312 N.W.2d 464, 468 (N.D. 1981); Sneed v. Sneed, 
585 P.2d 1363, 1366 (Okla. 1978); Elwell v. Elwell, 132 Vt. 73, __ , 313 A.2d 394, 395 (1973). 
147. When a woman has the right to use her own name, some couples agree that their future 
children will receive the paternal name to alleviate any judicial fear that a child will not receive the 
traditional paternal surname. In re Miller, 218 Va. 939, 243 S.E.2d 464, 467 (1978); In reStrikwerda, 
216 Va. 470, __ , 220 S.E.2d 245, 246 (1975). An Illinois court, however, has explicitly rejected the 
idea that a mother's right to her own name is related to the child's best interests: 
The best interests of the child are to be considered by the trial court in selecting the 
custodial parent. The name which the parent uses has not been held to be one of the 
relevant factors. The welfare of the child becomes an important consideration where 
the custodial parent petitions to change the name of the minor child [citations 
omitted], but not where the custodial parent seeks to change his or her own name. 
Thomas v. Thomas, 100 Ill. App. 3d 1080, __ , 427 N.E.2d 1009, 1010 (App. Ct. 1981). See May 
v. May, 6 Kan. App. 2d 24, 626 P.2d 801 (Ct. App. 1981) (even when there are children, 
"restoration of the wife's maiden or former name, upon her request, is mandatory"). 
148. See Comment, Name Game, supra note 13, at 143-58. 
149. Cowley v. Cowley, 1901 A.C. 450, 455; Welcker v. Welcker, 342 So. 2d 251, 254 (La. Ct. 
App. 1977); Lindsey v. Lindsey, 564 S.W.2d 143, 146 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978). 
!50. See generally Annat., supra note 6. 
151. See infra notes 162-64 and accompanying text. 
152. Most name cases concern changing a child's name. See generally Annat., supra note 6. But see 
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Courts, when considering the traditional paternal naming 
right, have used various adjectives to describe the legal significance 
·of a name. 153 In examining the nature of the father's naming right 
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in In re Tubbs154 stated that 
''quality of notice that is a person's due is determined by the 
essential character of the interest sought to be affected.'' 155 In 
noting that "personal rights [are] more precious than those of 
property" 156 the Tubbs court held the father's liberty interest made 
service by publication void. 157 It narrowed this holding, however, 
requiring personal notice only when the father's whereabouts are 
"known or readily ascertainable. " 158 
The Tubbs court recognized that other courts have not found 
the paternal naming right to be a property right protected by the 
due process clause of the Constitution. 159 The court nonetheless 
found that the father had a liberty interest because the paternal 
naming right is similar to essential rights, basic civil rights, and 
fundamental rights. 160 The court stated that the interest arising 
from the parental bond is the subject of constitutional protection 
under both the due process and equal protection clauses. 161 
When courts recognize a maternal liberty interest protected by 
the due process clause and the equal protection clause, 162 the 
infra text accompanying notes 186-97 for a discussion of the l'arents' right to select a child's birth 
name. 
153. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma expressed the traditional deference toward the father's 
preference as "a natural right, a fundamental right, a primary or time-honored right, a common-law 
right, a protectible interest, and even a legal right." In re Tubbs, 620 P.2d 384, 386 (Okla. 1980). See 
Carroll v. Johnson, 263 Ark. 280, 565 S.W.2d 10 (1978) (change of minor child's name without 
notice to noncustodial parent deprived parent of due process of law); Fulghum v. Paul, 229 Ga. 463, 
192 S.E.2d 376 (1972) (publication of proposed change of child's name was sufficient notice to father 
who has a protectable interest). 
Courts usually consider the paternal preference rather than the maternal preference because in 
most situations the married parents give the child the father's name. Yet, "[t]here are no reported 
cases to the knowledge of [attorney Priscilla Ruth MacDougall] which involve a man's trying to 
change the name of his marital child given its mother's name at birth when he has custody of the 
child. Nor is there any such case when the man does not have custody." Petitioner's Brief for 
Certiorari at 26, In re Saxton, 309 N. W. 2d 298 (Minn. 1981 ), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1737 ( 1982). 
154. 620 P.2d 384 (Okla. 1980). 
155. In re Tubbs, 620 P.2d 384, 386 (Okla. 1980). 
156. !d. But see Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972). The Lynch court 
reasoned that "[t]he dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a false one. 
Property does not have rights. People have rights." !d. at 552. 
157.620 P.2d at 388. 
158. !d. See Hardy v. Hardy, 269 Md. App. 412, 306 A.2d 244 (Ct. Spec. App. 1973) 
(remanded because publication was waived when whereabouts of father was known). 
159. 620 P.2d at 387. See Fulghum v. Paul, 229 Ga. 463, 192 S.E.2d 376 (1972). The Fulghum 
court stated the following: 
[T]his "protectible interest" is not a property right which comes within the meaning 
of the due process clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions. In our opinion such 
interest necessarily is taken into consideration by the trial court in ... carrying out its 
duty of acting in the best interests of the child as parens patriae. 
229 Ga. at __ , 192 S.E.2d at 378. 
160. In re Tubbs, 620 P.2d at 387. 
161. !d. 
162. See, e.g., Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769, 782-83 (M.D. Ala. 1976) ("liberty interest at 
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context is usually a paternity proceeding. 163 Statutes that 
automatically name a child with the father's surname upon 
recognition of paternity violate the mother's right to notice and 
equal protection. 164 
Courts therefore require that both the father and mother 
receive notice of a name change. This requirement, however, is not 
inconsistent with the custodial parent presumption, although 
according to the theoretical framework the noncustodial parent 
would presume that the custodial parent has the right to change a 
child's name. 165 The requirement of notice is comparable to the 
statutory requirement of notice to third parties, even though the 
petitioner has a common law right to adopt any nonfraudulent 
name. 166 In addition, the requirement of notice to the noncustodial 
parent would mitigate the noncustodial's concern that the child's 
name would be surreptitiously changed. Notice would therefore 
protect a parent's constitutional right to due process and equal 
protection and lessen a noncustodial parent's apprehension. 
4. The Parental Right to Name 
Even if a parent does have a constitutional right to procedural 
due process and equal protection, 167 the constitutional right of 
family autonomy and privacy give support to the custodial parent's 
presumptive naming right. 168 In order to recognize the relationship 
between the custodial parent's right to make significant decisions 
about the child's welfare 169 and the presumptive right to select a 
name for his or her child, courts will accept the custodial parent's 
naming right if they discern that naming is an incident of 
custody .170 Courts will grant constitutional protection to the 
custodial parent's decision if they view the custodial parent and 
child as a family to which the constitutional rights of family 
autonomy and privacy accrue. 
a. Naming as an Incident of Custody 
stake" and automatic paternal preference violates equal protection clause); jones v. McDowell, 53 
N.C. App. 434, 281 S.E.2d 192 (Ct. App. 1981) (liberty interest and equal protection violated by 
automatic change to paternal surname upon acknowledgement of paternity). 
163. Sometimes a court will deny jurisdiction to change a child's name in a paternity 
proceeding. See, e.g., Dana A. v. Harry M. W., 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2242 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. June 1, 
1982) (father can "pursue other avenues"). 
164. Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769, 782-83 (M.D. Ala. 1976); Jones v. McDowell, 53 N.C. 
App. 434, __ , 281 S.E.2d 192, 197 (Ct. App. 1981). 
165. See infra text accompanying notes I 71-83. 
166. Seesupra text accompanying notes I 02-11. 
167. See supra text accompanying notes 150-64. 
168. See infra text accompanying notes !86-201. 
!69. See supra text accompanying notes 15-19. 
170. See infra text accompanying notes 171-83. 
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Courts may be reluctant to accept the proposition that naming 
is an incident of custody because granting the custodial parent the 
presumptive right to select a name for a child might make the 
determination of custody more difficult. 171 But courts have faced 
similar problems in deciding which parent will be the custodial par-
ent and who will therefore have the right to control the child's 
development. 172 By separating the naming right from the other 
incidents of custody, courts have in effect fostered litigation. 173 As 
one court noted, "the chances of [children] developing emotional 
problems as they grow up increases in direct proportion to the 
thickness of the file involved in a divorce case.'' 174 Two facts 
support the proposition that naming is an incident of custody. 
First, noncustodial parents often invoke a court's jurisdiction 
by using divorce or separation decrees. 175 An Illinois court 
explicitly stated that ''a change of name of a minor child of 
divorced parents is [a] matter incidental to the custody.'' 176 
Second, the nature of the relationship between the custodial 
parent and the child indicates that the custodial parent guides the 
child's development. 177 Yet, courts that have upheld the traditional 
paternal naming preference have used this fact, not to support the 
custodial parent's decision, but rather to find that custody 
weakened the bond between the noncustodial parent and child. 178 
When these courts interpret the effect of custody as detrimental, 
they assume that the name creates the bond between the absent 
noncustodial parent and child, a bond they often describe as 
tenuous at best. 179 Yet, in few appellate name dispute cases have 
the fathers who have wanted their children to retain their surnames 
sought custody . 180 In some cases these fathers were even reluctant 
171. See, e.g., Cohee v. Cohee, 210 Neb. 855, 317 N. W .2d 381 (1982) (no presumption exists in 
favor of the custodial parent, but custody is a factor in determining the best interests of the child); Ex 
parte Stull, __ S.C. __ , 280 S.E.2d 209 (1981) (remanded to determine whether the proposed 
name change ''is actually the minor's decision rather than that of his cu•todial parent"). But see State 
ex rd. Spence-Chapin Servs. to Families & Children v. Tedeno, 101 Misc. 2d 485, 421 N. Y .S.2d 297 
(Sup. Ct. 1979) ("the mother has custody and it is she who will ... make major decisions"). 
172. See Devine v. Devine, 398 So. 2d 686, 696 (Ala. 1981) (court discards tender years 
presumption even though the presumption is an "anodyne" for the difficult decisions confronting 
the court in custody proceedings). 
173. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
174. King v. King, 10 Or. App. 324, __ , 500 P.2d 267, 269 (Ct. App. 1972). 
175. Set, e.g., Annat., supra note 6, at 1118-23 (incident to divorce and separation proceedings). 
But see Hurta v. Hurta, 25 Wash. App. 95, 605 P.2d 1278 (Ct. App. 1979) (no jurisdiction 
subsequent to dissolution); Annat., supra note 6, at 1107-18, 1123-26 Uurisdiction present in 
statutory proceedings and in extraordinary relief). 
176. Solomon v. Solomon, 5 III. App. 2d 297, __ , 125 N.E.2d 675, 678 (App. Ct. 1955). 
1 77. See supra text accompanying notes 16-19. 
178. See supra text accompanying notes 26-42. 
179. See, e.g., Mark v. Kahn, 333 Mass. 517, 131 N .E.2d 758 (1956). 
180. Brief for Appellant in Support of Motion for Rehearing at 17, Cohee v. Cohee, 210 Neh. 
855,317 N.W.2d 381 (1982). 
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to acknowledge paternity .tat 
The relationship between the custodial parent and child, 
however, is built upon the custodial parent's right to direct the 
child's development- psychological, educational, and religious.t 82 
Because a name can have psychological, educational, and religious 
significance,t 83 a custodial parent should also determine a child's 
name. The selection of a name would thus be one aspect of the 
custodial parent's duty to direct the development of a child's 
identity. 
b. The Custodial Parent and Child as a Family 
The phrase ''broken home'' is a common expression used to 
describe a family that experienced divorce. While this expression 
indicates that a child's parents live in separate residences, the 
metaphor does not account for the daily responsibilities that a 
custodial parent possesses. The central reason for recognizing the 
custodial parent and child as a family is the similarity between the 
autonomous acts of a custodial parent and the autonomous acts of 
parents.t 84 Although this reason is logically intertwined with the 
recogmtwn of naming as an incident of custody, tas it is 
distinguishable in this context because the emphasis is on the 
custodial parent's authority to act, not upon the individual 
decisions that a custodial parent makes. A discussion of the 
authority vested in parents reveals the similar authority of the 
custodial parent. 
Three cases describe the protection afforded to parents in 
selecting a name for their child. In Secretary of Commonwealth v. City 
Clerk of Lowellt 86 the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 1977 
declared unlawful the town clerk's refusal to follow the three state 
attorney general opinions that recognized the common law freedom 
to select any nonfraudulent name. 187 The court held that the 
common law protected the parents' decision.tsa The naming right 
181. See Cohee v. Cohee, 210 Neb. 855, 317 N. W .2d 381 (1982). 
182. See supra text accompanying notes 16-19. 
183. Some psychologists have conducted studies of children's names. See Busse, Identical First 
Names for Parent and Child, 107 J. Soc. PsYcH. 293 (1979); Eagleson, Students' Reactions to Their Given 
Names, 23 J. Soc. PsYCH. 187 (1946); Ellis & Beechley, Emotional Disturbance in Children with Peculiar 
Given Names, 85 J. GENETIC ?sYCH. 337 (1954); Nelson, First-Name Stereotypes and Expected Academic 
Achievement of Students, 41 PsYCH. REP. 1343 (1977). 
A name also has cultural and educational significance. See, e.g., Note, supra note 12, at 303 (a 
name may instruct children in familial and societal values). 
184. See infra text accompanying notes !86-201. 
185. See supra text accompanying notes I 72-83. 
186. 373 Mass. 178, 366 N.E.2d 717 (1977). 
187. Secretary of Commonwealth v. City Clerk, 373 Mass. 178, __ , 366 N.E.2d 717, 722 
(1977). 
188. !d. at __ , 366 N.E.2d at 725. 
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was even sufficiently broad to protect a foolish decision. 189 The 
court stated that the "[p ]arents' claim to authority in their own 
household to direct the rearing of their children is basic to the 
structure of society. '' l9o 
Two years later in jech v. Burch, 191 a federal district court in 
Hawaii recognized that this common law freedom was protected by 
the fourteenth amendment. 192 Even though the court noted that no 
case had previously dealt with the constitutional dimensions of 
naming, 193 it found that the "naming of one's own child comes 
with this [the preamble of the Constitution] catalogue of blessings 
of liberty. " 194 The court therefore protected the parents' right to 
give their child a name derived from both their surnames. 195 
jech was found controlling in the 1981 decision of 0 'Brien v. 
Tilson. 196 A district court in North Carolina held that a statute 
which required children of married parents to be given their 
father's surname was unconstitutional because it infringed upon 
the important constitutional interests affecting family life, 
procreation, child rearing, privacy, and individual expression. 197 
189. !d. at __ , 366 N.E.2d at 724. 
190. /d. at __ , 366 N .E.2d at 723. A case comment summarizes the liberty afforded to parents 
in this case: 
(T]his decision extended the common law principle of freedom to choose a name to 
include the right of parents to give their child whatever surname they desire, including 
one not borne by either parent. It became a "short step" for the court to approve the 
use of a hyphenated version of both parents surnames in the recording of a child's 
surname. This freedom and authority stems from the concept of family autonomy. 
Comment, Recording of Surnames - Clerks Have No Authority to Inhibit the Rights of Individuals to Choose 
Their Own and Their Children's Surnames. Secretary of the Commonwealth v. City Clerk of Lowell, 13 NEw 
ENc. L. Rev. 588, 593 (1977)(footnotes omitted). 
191.466 F. Supp. 714(D. Hawaii 1979). 
192. Jech v. Burch, 466 F. Supp. 714, 719 (D. Hawaii 1979). The court stated that "a proper 
interpretation of Anglo-American political and legal history and precedent leads to the conclusion 
that parents have a common law right to give their child any name they wish, and that the 
Fourteenth Amendment protects this right from arbitrary state action." /d. The court further 
explained that "the statutory provision for a name change is not a substitute for the right to insist 
that one's child at birth was given the original name designated.'' /d. at 720 (emphasis in original). 
193. !d. at 719. 
194. !d. To support recognition of the parents' constitutional naming right, a right derived from 
the rights to liberty and privacy, the district court cited the following cases: Smith v. Organization of 
Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (foster parents may have a protected 
liberty interest); Cleveland Board of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (right of pregnant 
woman to continue working); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to terminate pregnancy); 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to contraceptives); and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 
U.S. 390 (1923) (right to teach children a foreign language). 
195. 466 F. Supp. at 721. Parents named their child "Jebef," a combination ofjech and Befurt. 
/d. 
196.523 F. Supp. 494(E.D.N.C. 1981). 
197. O'Brien v. Tilson, 523 F. Supp. 494, 496 (E.D.N.C. 1981). The court stated that the 
interest of the Registrar of Vital Statistics could be one of developing a filing system that identifies 
children by "A-I, A-2, and A-3, or Huey, Duey and Louey" as long as parents have the right to 
choose the child's surname at birth. !d. at497. See Rice v. Department of Health and Rehab. Servs., 
386 So. 2d 844 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). The Rice court, though remanding to an agency before 
reaching the constitutional question, articulated the factors to be considered in examining the 
constitutionality of a statute requiring the father's name to be given at birth. /d. at 849-50. The 
dissent vehemently criticized the decision to remand: "What is to be lost is obvious: time, money 
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Although these three cases involve parents who agree on the 
name of their child, the cases nonetheless support recognition of the 
custodial parent's right to select a name because the cases the courts 
cited to support the holdings give broad deference to family 
autonomy .198 Cases that protect parental authority in the areas of 
education and religion199 support the custodial parent presumption 
because this authority is vested in the custodial parent. 200 The 
Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the family's special status in 
stating that ''freedom of personal choice in matters of family 
life ... [is] a fundamental liberty interest protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.' ' 201 
The custodial parent and child are a family because of the 
degree of control that the custodial parent exercises. 202 At common 
law this control would give the custodial parent the title of'' head of 
household. " 203 As head of household the custodial parent would 
have the exclusive right to determine the surname of legitimate 
children. 204 But courts used the title almost exclusively in 
relationship to men, 205 even if they did not live at home, did not 
support the family, or were supported by their wives. 206 The advent 
of the Married Women's Property Act, however, freed women 
from this legally inferior status. 207 The recognition of the custodial 
parent presumption would similarly discard the implicit preference 
of male control in naming under the guise of preserving a paternal 
bond. 208 With the abolition of the tender years doctrine that 
preserved the anachronistic, sex-stereotype view that a mother was 
presumptively a better parent for a young child, 209 courts can 
therefore be free of both stereotypes that interfere with ascertaining 
the child's best interest - the focus of their inquiry in determining 
and peace-of~ mind for individuals relegated by the majority to the administrative morass." !d. "' 
854. 
198. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (right of extended family members 
to live together); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (right to educate children in a 
private school). 
199. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (right to rear children in accordance 
with parental religious beliefs); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (right to educate 
children in private school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right to teach children a 
foreign language). 
200. See supra text accompanying notes 73-77. 
201. Santosky v. Kramer, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1394 (1982). 
202. See supra notes 16-19, 184-97 and accompanying text. 
203. Carlsson, supra note 37, at 563. 
204. Carlsse>n, supra note 37, at 563. 
205. Carlsson, supra note 37, at 563-68. 
206. Carlsson, supra note 37, at 563-68. 
207. In re Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d 640, 643, 620 P.2d 579, 581, 169 Cal. Rptr. 918, 920 (1980) 
("In the mid-19th century Married Women's Property Acts returned to wives a separate legal 
identity."). 
208. See supra text accompanying notes 27-42. 
209. See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text. 
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custody. Once the court determines custody, the right to family 
autonomy would therefore vest in the custodial parent. 
IV. A COURT'S USE OF THE CUSTODIAL PARENT 
PRESUMPTION 
To employ the custodial parent presumption a court must first 
determine who is the custodial parent. 210 After such a 
determination a court must weigh the evidence offered by the 
noncustodial parent that shows new facts and changed 
circumstances subsequent to the custody determination. 211 Both 
steps present a court with different degrees of difficulties depending 
upon specific facts. 
A. DETERMINING THE CusTODIAL PARENT 
The problem of ascertaining who has custody, though 
seemingly resolved at the original custody determination, arises 
from the theory that custody is a bundle of rights and 
responsibilities. 212 When a parent abandons a child the parent is 
noncustodial because no ties bind the child and the parent. 213 But 
when a parent has a right to visitation a court may determine 
custody by clocking the amount of time a child spends with a 
parent214 or by considering the quality of that time, namely 
whether the parent provides what is traditionally described as a 
home. 215 
If parents equally provide a home for the child, 216 then the 
court may consider the factor of financial responsibility. 217 A court, 
however, should not consider this factor if the previous marriage 
adversely influenced the present economic status of an individual 
210. See justice v. Hobbs, 245 Iowa 707, 63 N. W .2d 882 ( 1954) ("custody" is a slippery word). 
211. In re Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d 640, 650, 620 P.2d 579, 585, 169 Cal. Rptr. 918, 924 (1980) 
(Mask, J., concurring). 
212. H. CLARK, DoMESTic RELATIONs 573 (1968). 
213. Abandonment demands definition, for one of the residual parental rights that remains after 
custody is placed in another includes the right to have the child bear the parent's name. L.A.M. v. 
State, 547 P.2d827, 833 n.13(Aiaska 1976). 
214. But seeM. MoRGENBESSER & N. NEHLS, JoiNT CusTODY 30 (1981) ("[t]he central issue [in 
joint custody] is not how much time the child spends with each parent but that the two parents have 
equal rights and responsibilities for childrearing. ''). 
215. See generalry Blustein, supra note 15, at 11 7-21. 
216. The act of quantifying time spent with each parent may ignore th~ reality of child rearing, 
for a child who is at least five years old may have the opportunity to be with the noncustodial parent 
only during summer vacation. M. MoRGENBESSER & N. NEHLS, supra note 214, at 30. 
217. Some courts have explicitly recognized the factor of financial responsibility in terms of the 
traditional paternal preference. See, e.g., In re Harris, 236 S.E.2d 426 (W. Va. 1977) ("The weight of 
authority appears to be that absent extreme circumstances a father who exercises his parental rights 
has a protectable interest in his children bearing his surname and this interest is one quid pro quo of his 
reciprocal obligation of support and maintenance.'') 
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parent218 or if this factor does not directly relate to the essential 
nurturing quality of a parent. 219 Therefore, the determination of 
custody theoretically appears as a continuum, with one end 
symbolizing abandonment and the other, equal responsibilities. 
In practice the issue of who is the custodial parent is generally 
resolved by a court's requiring proof of legal custody demonstrated 
by a previous court order or proof of actual custody documented by 
an affidavit. 220 When a court decree indicates an award of joint 
custody the custodial parent presumption would be inapplicable 
and a court would determine the child's best interests. But once it 
finds custody vested in one parent, a court would next address the 
noncustodial parent's burden of proof necessary to rebut the 
presumption that the custodial parent acts in the child's best 
interests. 
B. DETERMINING NEW FACTS AND CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES 
Once the court ascertains who is the custodial parent, it must 
determine whether "new facts and changed circumstances',' exist 
subsequent to the original custody order. 221 This issue can also be 
expressed in other terms, either specifically as described in custody 
statutes or case law222 or generally as "against the child's best 
interest'' because the custodial parent presumptively acts in the 
child's best interest. 223 Two circumstances suggest a decided 
change in the status quo- remarriage and relocation. 224 
Remarriage by the custodial parent not only provides a child 
with a stepparent but may also offer siblings from the new parent's 
218. The thesis of Uviller's article is that the standard for custody should be based upon each 
party's sacrifice of time and energy during the marriage. Uviller, supra note 5, at 112. Uviller also 
notes that other factors would unduly influence the award of custody to the male parent: financial 
consideration, amount of education, and possibility of remarriage. Uviller, supra note 5, at 112. 
219. Psychologists Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit describe the psychological parent as "one who, 
on a continuing, day-to-day basis, through interaction, companionship, interplay, and mutuality, 
fulfills the child's psychological needs for a parent, as well as the child's physical needs." J. 
GoLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNIT, supra note 99, at 98. 
220. When a court receives affidavits from both parents, it may resolve the issue based on its 
theory of custody. See supra text accompanying notes 212-19. A court may also view the parents as 
having joint custody. See supra note 214. 
221. "New facts and changed circumstances" is the standard in California for considering a 
change in custody. In reMarriage of Carney, 24 Cal. 3d 725, 730, 598 P.2d 36, 39, 157 Cal. Rptr. 
383' 385 ( 1979). 
222. See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE AcT § 409 (1979) (previously unknown facts or 
change in circumstances of child or custodian, and modification necessary to serve best interest of 
child); In re Wheat, 68 Ill. App. 3d 4 71, 386 N. E.2d 278 (App. Ct. 1979) (substantially changed 
circumstances). 
223. In re Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d 640,648, 620 P.2d 579, 584, 169 Cal. Rptr. 918,923 (1980) 
(Mosk, J., concurring). 
224. Authors Morgenbesser and Nehls specifically mention remarriage and relocation as two 
circumstances that create problems in joint custody cases. M. MoRGENBESSER & N. NEHLS, joiNT 
CusTODY 111-18 (1981). The authors, who advocate joint custody, unfortunately do not describe 
how a court should address these problems. 
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previous marriage or from the new marriage. 225 The remarriage of 
the noncustodial parent may similarly result in new relationships, 
yet those relationships may not have the same effect on the child's 
immediate social environment. 226 
A change in the physical environment through relocation of 
either parent affects the bond between the noncustodial parent and 
child. 227 To consider this circumstance in the context of who 
initiates the move may impair the constitutional rights of family 
autonomy228 and travel. 229 
Although both remarriage and relocation do alter the status 
quo, the court may interpret these circumstances differently. When 
the custodial parent remarries or relocates the court may support 
the presumption by assuming that the custodial parent will 
continue to act in the child's best interest. 230 This interpretation of 
the status quo examines the custodial parent's ability to make 
significant decisions, not the environment of the child. If a court 
relates the status quo to a child's environment, then it would 
consider how the custodial parent's remarriage or relocation affects 
the child's environment. 
When the noncustodial parent remarries the court may 
require other evidence of a change in the status quo because this 
remarriage may have a less direct impact upon the child. 231 When 
the noncustodial parent relocates the court may evaluate the 
continuing vitality of the noncustodial parent-child bond in light of 
its previous character. 232 A court's consideration of the bond 
between the noncustodial parent and child signifies that it 
interprets the status quo as a change in a child's environment, not 
as a question of the custodial parent's ability to act in the child's 
best interest. 233 
225. An analysis of how remarriage affects a child logically must encompass the specific fiH·ts of 
each case. How a court interprets the facts depends upon its interpretation of what constinJtes a 
''family.'' See supra text accompanying notes 202-09. 
226. See supra text accompanying notes 202-04. 
227. M. MoRGENBESSER & N. NEHLS, .Jot NT CusTonv 115-18 ( 1981 ). 
228. Family au!Onomy derives from vdrious sources. See Caban v. Mohommad, 441 U.S. 3BIJ 
(1979) (equal protection on the basis of sex); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 559 (1978j (equal protenion on 
the basis of illegitimacy); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (proc .. dural due process); Wisconsin,._ 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (first amendment religion); Tinker v. Des Moines School Distri,t, 3'-J:l 
L:.S. 503 (1969) (first amendment speech). 
229. The right 10 travel interstate is grounded upon the privileges and immunities clause of 
article IV, section 2 of the United States Constitution. Paul v. Virginia, 75 C.S. (8 Wall) 16B, ISO 
(1868); Corficld v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546,552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 182:{)(No. 3230). 
230. For a discussion ofthe significance of presumptions, see supra note 62. 
231. The amount of weight a court gives to the fact of remarriage depends upon its inter-
pretation of presumptions. Seesupra note 62. 
2:12. A court's consideration of the previous character relates to Uviller's thesis that the court 
should originally award custody on the basis of the sacrifice oftimt· and energy during the marrial(e. 
U"illcr, supra note 5, at 117-30. 
233. This interpretation of the status quo would silllilarly :d'fi:ct a ·:ourt's evalu;,tion of the 
custodial parent's rcn1arriage or relocation. 
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The facts of each case thus invite judicial discretion when the 
court must define custody and new circumstances. Discretion does 
not, however, necessarily invoke a balancing process that 
undermines the custodial parent presumption's value in keeping 
quarrelling parents from seeking vexatious suits. 234 The custodial 
parent presumption describes a rebuttable presumption. 235 An 
inference236 would afford too little protection to a child used as a 
pawn by angry parents, while a conclusive presumption237 would 
probably be an unconstitutional infringement of liberty. 238 The 
gender neutral language of the custodial parent presumption is also 
consistent not only with recent decisions concerning sex 
discrimination239 but also with the advancement of women's rights 
in the 1970s. 240 
A disadvantage of the model may be that the practical 
application mandates judicial discretion. 241 Yet, judicial discretion 
may be viewed as a necessary element in the area of domestic 
relations, where each family offers unique circumstances. The 
custodial parent presumption provides a structure for such judicial 
discretion. 242 The presumption is therefore one that is rebuttable 
yet possesses substance. 
V. CONCLUSION 
A court may resolve the controversy over a child's name by 
2~4. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
235. See supra note 62. See generally F. jAMES & G. HAZARD, CtVIL PROCEDURE 253-61 (2d ed. 
1977). 
236. Inferences are defined as "deciuctions or conclusions which with reason and common sense 
lead the jury to draw from facts which have been established by the evidence in the case.'' BLACK's 
LAW DICTIONARY 700 (5th ed. 1979). 
237. A conclusive presumption is defined as "[a]n artificially compelling force which requires 
[the] trier of fact to find such fact as is conclusively presumed and which renders evidence to the 
contrary inadmissible." !d. at 263. 
238. See, e.g., Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769 (M.D. Ala. 1976). The Alabama court held that 
an illegitimate child's liberty interest was unconstitutionally infringed upon by the complete control 
in naming that a father possesses when legally acknowledging paternity. The court further stated that 
the father's absolute right undermined family integrity and served no legitimate state interest in 
administrative convenience. !d. at 782-83. 
239. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (classifications based on sex are 
inherently suspect and therefore must be subjected to close judicial scrutiny). 
240. See, e.g., Kruzel v. Podell, 67 Wis. 2d at __ , 226 N .W.2d at 463 ("[t]he common law. 
has never ossified to the point of holding that a wife is required to take her husband's name"). 
241. See supra notes I 09-14 and accompanying text. 
242. Legislative adoption would be preferable to judicial acceptance ef the custodial parent 
presumption because noncustodial parents would have explicit notice at the divorce proceeding that 
abolition of the paternal preference in naming and of the tender years doctrine allows acceptance of 
the logical proposition that naming is an incident of custody. See supra text accompanying notes I 71-
83. 
A custodial parent may stipulate in the divorce decree that the child's name will not be changed. 
Yet such an agreement treats the naming right as a right distinct from the incidents of custody and 
fails to account for circumstances that would prompt the custodial parent to change a child's name in 
accordance with the belief that a change is then in the child's best interests. See supra text 
accompanying notes 68-72. The agreement would also infringe on the right to family autonomy. See 
supra text accompanying notes 186-201. 
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employing the custodial parent presumption. This concept creates 
a rebuttable presumption: the custodial parent, who presumptively 
acts in the child's best interest, has the right to select or change a 
child's name, unless the noncustodial parent can show new facts or 
changed circumstances that would bar such a change. The 
presumption protects the custodial parent's naming decision 
because, like other important decisions that a custodial parent 
makes, the choice of a name is a significant decision with legal 
significance. 
The history of name change litigation reveals not only the 
significance of a name but also suggests that judicial acceptance of 
the custodial parent presumption builds from this historical 
foundation. For a court to employ the custodial parent presumption 
in resolving a naming dispute, it would engage in a two-step 
process: the determination of who is the custodial parent and of 
what constitutes new facts or changed circumstances. Because these 
steps require factual inquiry, a court would have discretion in 
interpreting the specific circumstances of each case. The custodial 
parent presumption, affording a court the opportunity to consider 
the unique factors of the family naming dispute, provides a court 
with an approach that seeks to protect a child's best interest. 
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